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AN EXAM[NATION OF AMERICAN AND
GERMAN CORPORATE LAW NORMS
FRANCK CHANTAYAN

I. INTRODUCTION
Business enterprises have been merging for thousands of
years.l Today's mergers are more complex and more regulated
2
than before which can produce some unique problems.
Challenges range from combining different corporate cultures,
production and service resource,
to meeting regulatory
restrictions. 3 In 1998 there were $2.5 trillion worth of mergers
internationally.4 The merger between Daimler-Benz AG and
I See 2500 B.C. The Code of Hammurabi §§ 100 to 107 (c.1780 B.C.) (translated by
L.W. King) (denoting the existence of business enterprises such as merchants, brokers,
and agents). Other sections of Hammurabi's Code deal with other business enterprises
such as taverns, ship building, and construction. Id, See also, HARRY G. HENN AND JOHN
R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §5, at 14 (3d ed., West 1983) [hereinafter HENN,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS] (stating there are references to corporations as far back as the
Code of Hammurabi c.2083 B.C.).
2 See Jeffrey E. Garten, Megamergers are a Clear and Present Danger,Bus. WI.,
Jan. 25, 1999, at 28 (discussing mergers between Citibank and Travelers, WorldCom and
MCI, British Petroleum and Amoco, and Daimler and Chrysler); see also Howard Banks,
Wishful Thinking, FORBES, Nov. 27, 2000, at 52 (stating European Community may
demand divestiture of certain assets before approval is given for the General Electric Honeywell merger); John R. Wilke, FTC Demands New Changes in AOL Merger, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at A3 (stating $122 billion merger of America Online and Time
Warner has been under scrutiny by the FTC and major concessions are expected before its
approval).
3 See Jeffrey E. Garten, Daimlerhas to Steer the ChryslerMerger,BUS. WK., July 20,
1998, at 20 (indicating differences in strategy and culture must be overcome for merger to
succeed); Karen Lowery Miller & Joann Muller, The Auto Baron, BUS. WE., Nov. 16, 1998,
at 82 (suggesting Daimler and Chrysler have two "starkly different corporate cultures,"
and Daimler's methodical approach to decision making could crush Chrysler's greatest
asset, its creativity); see also William Echikson, The Equalzer, BUS. WE., Oct. 9, 2000, at
62 (describing Mario Monti, chief of European Commission's competition office in Brussels
and his mission to protect Europe from uncompetitive mergers, even those between
American companies).
4 See Mergersare No Menace, BUS. WE., Jan. 18, 1999, at 114 (indicating mergers hit
worldwide peek in 1998); see also Laura M. Holson, Outlook 1999: Economy and Industry
- Mergers,After $2.5 Trilion in Combinationsin 1998, the Sky's the Limit in 1999, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at Cll (predicting 1999's merger activity would break 1998's record
of $2.5 trillion worldwide); Paul M. Sherer, The Lesson from Chrysler,Citicorp and Mobil:
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Chrysler Corporation into the world's fifth largest automobile
manufacturer,5 Daimler-Chrysler, accounted for $36 billion of the
1998 total mergers. 6
This article will examine the American and German corporate
law norms, and consider how a melding of these different legal
systems can affect a global corporation. The merger of two
companies is difficult enough when they have the same legal
structure and a similar cultural basis, such as in a domestic
merger, but when the merger is between companies that have
completely different legal systems and cultural approaches the
challenges of merging two companies becomes exponential. 7
There are vast differences between the American and German
approaches
to corporate
governance,
and
ownership. 8
Additionally, culture, politics and history can play a role in
developing these corporate law norms. 9 The conclusion will opine
No Companies Nowadays are Too Big to Merge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1999, at R8
(reporting $2.489 trillion worth of announced mergers and acquisition in 1998, up 54%
from 1997).
5 See Miller & Muller, supra note 3, at 82 (describing Jurgen Schrempp's unique
challenges merging two different corporate cultures as CEO of DaimlerChrysler, world's
fifth largest automaker); see also Business Digest, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at C1
(noting DaimlerChrysler, world's fifth largest automaker, had increased sales of 13% in
1998); Jagdish N. Seth & Rajendra Sisoda, Manager'sJournal: Only the Big Three will
Thrive, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1998, at A22 (commenting DaimlerChrysler's merger into
fifth largest automaker is necessary according to "Rule of Three" where only three major
players can survive in competitive markets).
6 See DaimlerChrysler Settles Outstanding German Lawsuits on Merger,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 11, 1998. See generally Edmund L. Andrews & Laura M. Holson,
Shapinga Global Giant: The Overview; Daimler-Benz will Acquire Chryslerin $36 Billhon
Deal that Will Reshape Industz, N. Y. TIMES, May 7, 1998, at Al (announcing $36 billion
merger of American and German automakers); Joann Muller, The One-Year Itch at
DaimlerChrysler, BUS. WK-, Nov. 15, 1999, at 42 (reporting reorganization of
DaimlerChrysler which was formed in $36 billion transatlantic merger).
7. See Garten, supra note 3, at 20 (stating challenges facing international mergers are
often too great to overcome); see also Miller & Muller, supra note 3, at 82 (describing
Jurgen Schrempp's unique challenges merging two different corporate cultures as CEO of
DaimlerChrysler, world's fifth largest automaker). See generallyBanks, supra note 2, at
52 (commenting on Europe's increased protectionism).
8 CompareDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) (Supp. 1998) (indicating there will
be one board of directors that will control the affairs of the corporation) (emphasis added),
with § 30(1) AktG (creating the supervisory board); § 30(4) AktG (providing the
supervisory board will elected the board of management); § 82(1) AktG (indicating the
management board directs the corporations affairs).
9 See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., CulturalHegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon
Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 119 (1998) (indicating
lack of hostile takeovers in Germany is result of business ethics and cultural norms which
have culminated in no "statutory takeover code" being developed); see also David
Charney, The German CorporateGovernance System, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 145, 145
(1998) (mentioning Germany developed different rules due to its dissimilar economics and
politics); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Futureas History. The Prospectsfor Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 641, 655 (1999)
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the likely challenges facing a global merger.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Corporation law in the United States and Germany developed
from the same early foundations, the law of merchants.1 0 The
overseas trading companies and joint stock companies of the 16th
and 17th century were the early models for the modern
corporation."1 Common law courts of England in the 18th century
began to adopt certain portions of the early law of merchants,
12
which developed into modern corporation law.
In Civil law countries, by contrast, the law of merchants
survived until the 19th and 20th centuries when European
countries codified their laws.1 3 European countries developed the
law of merchants into a commercial code.' 4 While the civil codes
of the various European countries vary in many aspects, they
have maintained common terminology and concepts. 15
It is from these early beginnings in the development of
corporation law that the common law and civil law systems took
divergent paths.' 6 A notable distinction between the two systems
is that German corporation law did not develop the law-equity

(asserting historical factors such as national borders have resulted in differences between
U.S. and European corporate governments).
10 See HARRY G. HENN AND JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, §7, at 15
[hereinafter HENN] (stating early merchant law transcended local law giving uniformity
to transactions, early "agency, partnership and corporations were part of the
development"); see also P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice ofLaw, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 1, 9 (stating Law Merchant in "U.S. culminated in the Uniform Commercial Code");
Ingid Lynn Lenhardt, The Corporateand Tax Advantage ofa Limited Liability Company
A GermanPerspective,64 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 551 (1996) (mentioning AG originates from
"the 17th century British companies that traded on joint stock").
11 See HENN, supranote 10, §10, at 19 (stating "great overseas trading companies and
joint stock companies" were prototypes of modern companies).
12 See id. §7, at 16 (indicating Chief Justice Holt began selective absorption process in
early 18th century which was nearly completed by Lord Mansfield in latter part of 18th
century).
13 See id. §7, at 15-16 (stating law of merchants survived and was administered by
separate courts); see also R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS
520, 529-30, 737-40, 786-93 (4th ed. 1980).
14 See HENN, supranote 10, §7, at 15-16.
15 See id. §7, at 15-16(indicating unifying influence of Roman law developed common
features in civil codes); see also Philip W. Thayer, Comparative Law and the Law
Merchant, 6 BROOK- L. REV. 139, 140 (1936) (stating "notion that the law merchant is
common to all countries is of early vintage).
16 See HENN, supra note 10, §8, at 16-17 (stating early civil corporation law did not
recognized distinction between law and equity as did early common corporation law).
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distinction that evolved in Anglo-American corporation law.17
Accordingly, German corporation law did not develop the same
approach to fiduciary duties that developed in the Anglo-America
corporate system.1 8 Under this early civil law system there was
great
freedom to
contract for fiduciary
duties
and
responsibilities.19 Whereas, much of the common law system
developed from sovereign grants. Eventually, abuses in the
freedom to contract for duties developed in the civil law system
and substantial reforms of the laws governing corporations and
corporate financing were instituted. 20
The German system has developed several forms of business
enterprises, similar to the American system. 2 1 There are two
forms of corporations in Germany, the Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter Haftung, called GmbH for short, and the
Aktiengesellschaft, or AG.22 The GmbH is more closely related to
the American version of the closed corporation. 23 By contrast, the
17 See id §8, at 16-17 (indicating law-equity distinction unique to Anglo-American
system).
18 See id. (stating civil law does not have "remedies for the enforcement of fiduciary
duties which have been developed by English and American chancery or equity courts").
19 See id. (indicating corporations developed through freedom of contract and not
sovereign grant); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance:
The Lessons from SecuritiesMarket Failure,25 IOwA J. CORP. L. 1, 29 (1999) (stating
certain steps have been taken in civil law jurisdictions, particularly Germany, in
recognizing fiduciary duty). See generallyRamon E. Reyes, Jr., Nauru v Australia: The
InternationalFiduciaryDuty and the Settlement ofNauru's Claims for Rehabilitationof
Its Phosphate Lands, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COmp. L. 1, 44 (1996) (noting fiduciary
duty is recognized under civil law system).
20 See HENN, supra note 10, §8, at 17 (stating corporate reform movement was
spurred by abuses in freedom of contract); see also DROSTE KILLIUS TRIEBEL, BUSINESS
LAW GUIDE TO GERMANY 119 (3d ed. 1991) (indicating Germany's corporation law of 1937
was "significantly revised" in 1965); Lenhardt, supra note 10, at 553-54 (stating German
corporation law was revised in 1937 and again in 1965).
21 See HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 23941 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1982) (outlining and explaining various forms of
German business enterprises); TRIEBEL, supra note 20, at 96-127 (describing various
business structures available in Germany); Friedrich Kubler, Corporate Governance:
Comment: On Mark Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 214 (1999) [hereinafter Kubler, Corporate Governance] (noting
American and German law both present variety of different legal structures).
22 See Kubler, supra note 21, at 214 (noting German law basically allows for two legal
structures, AG and GmbH); Lenhardt, supranote 10, at 551 (indicating that there are two
forms of incorporation); see also Kubler, The Fourth Abraham L. Pomerantz: Tensions
Between InstitutionalOwners and Corporate Managers: An InternationalPerspective:
InstitutionalOwners and CorporateManagers:A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV.,
97, 98 (1991) [hereinafter Kubler, Pomerant] (noting AG is stock corporation and GmbH
is private company).
23 See Lenhardt, supra note 10, at 551-53 (stating "GmbH[s] [were] designed to be
privately held" and finding majority of German business enterprises are in such form
because they allow owners to maintain control of business while having limited liability);
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Aktiengesellschaft, which means stock corporation, 24 is the
equivalent to the American publicly traded corporation. 25 Of the
nearly 2500 AGs registered in 1989, only 530 were sold on a
public exchange. 26 The majority of publicly held corporations are
owned by a group of banks.27 Diverse corporate ownership of
public corporations in Germany is still a rare occurrence. The
majority of shares purchased in the companies by private
individuals are purchased through one of the large banks, similar
to any other product the bank would make available to
depositors. 2 8 It is only recently that the German stock exchange
has been revamped in order to draw greater investment from
29
private investors.
Sandra

I

Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affliiated Companies in the

European Community and in the US.: A Comparative Analysis of US., German, and
UK Veil-PiercingApproaches, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 99 (1998) (stating German GmbHs
and U.S. close corporations are very similar business enterprises); see also DR. DIETER
BEINERT, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS IN GERMANY 10 (Graham & Trotman
199 1) (stating "GmbH has become the most popular corporate form").
24 See TRIEBEL, supra note 20, at 118-19 (describing German stock corporation); see
also Lenhardt,
supra note 10, at 551 (stating Aktiengesellschaft means stock
corporation). See generally Andre, supra note 9, at 83 (1998) (finding AG was created
partly to protect interests of creditors and employees).
25 See Lenhardt, supranote 10, at 551 (stating Aktiengesellschaftwas developed to be
publicly traded corporation); Miller, supranote 23, at 96 (1998) (asserting AG is similar to
publicly-held corporation in U.S.); see also TRIEBEL, supra note 20, at 119 (noting
corporate law governing AGs consists of 410 provisions compared to 85 provisions for law
governing GmbHs).
26 See BEINERT, supra note 23, at 14 (finding publicly held corporations trading in
open exchange still remains around 20% of register corporations); see also Lenhardt,
supra note 10, at 555 n. 26 (asserting only small portion of AGs were listed on stock
exchange prior to enactment of Small Stock Incorporation Act); Gustavo Visentini,
Compatibilityand Competition Between European and American Corporate Governance:
Which Model of CapitalismZ 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833, 836 n. 12 (1998) (understanding
in 1996, Germany only accounted for small portion of companies trading on New York
Stock Exchange and recognizing that those German companies traded at low volume).
27 See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A
Glimpse at German Supervisory Board, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1834 (1996) [hereinafter
Andre, Reflections] (stating German banks having control over German companies is
widely practiced wonder of German coporate goverance system); Charny, supra note 9, at
147 (asserting "large bank dominated corporate enterprise is only one such structure," but
it is given greatest consideration); Kubler, Pomerantz, supra note 22, at 99 (1991)
(claiming institutional investment in Germany is mostly dominated by banks).
28 See Theodor Baums & Michael Gruson, The German Banking System - System of
the Future, 19 BROOK J. INT'L L. 101, 106 (1993) (add parenthetical). See generally
Kubler, Corporate Governance, supra note 22, at 215 (observing "structure of equity
holding in large German firms" commonly has one stockholder owning substantial portion
of stock); Kubler, Pomerantz, supra note 22, at 99-100 (stating example of bank
traditionally dominating shares of corporation's stock is "28.5 percent holding of Deutsche
Bank in Daimler-Benz").
29 See James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider's Look into the Regulation ofInsider Trading
in Germany A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (asserting financial markets in
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There are several notable distinctions between German and
American corporation law. For example, the German rules are
national rules while in America each state has developed its own
set of corporate governance rules. 30 The German rules are mostly
mandatory rules that may be modified to a limited extent if
provided for in the company's charter. 3 1 By contrast, American
corporate governance rules are mostly permissive. 32
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

One of the greatest distinctions between the American and
German corporate governance scheme is the board of directors. 33
Germany are presently being reformed); Mary E. Kissane, Note, Global Gadlies:
Apphcation and Implementation of U.S. -Style Corporate GovernanceAbroad, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & Compn'. L. 621, 651-52 (1997) (noting federal legislation has been
implemented to reduce banks' shareholdings and realizing that large role of banks has
discouraged global investment). See generally Lee E. Michaels and Marc I. Steinberg,
Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches,
Commonahty and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 221-22 (1999) (noting there are
eight German Stock Exchanges and that each of these exchanges has three different
market segments).
30 See TRIEBEL, supra note 20, at 118-19 (reasoning German corporate governance
system, which is provided for in Aktiengestz (AktG), stock corporation law is different
from American corporate governance system, which is decided by laws of state under that
company is incorporated); see also Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1824
(understanding U.S. senior executives serve demands of board, unless contracted
otherwise, while German executives cannot legally delegate functions to supervisory
board); Sandra K Miller, Piercingthe Corporate Veil Among Affliated Companiesin the
European Community and in the U.S.: A ComparativeAnalysis of US., German, and
UK Veil-PiercingApproaches, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 95 (1998) (stating private companies
in Germany, unlike those in U.S., must make public disclosures of financial information
on annual basis).
31 See TRIEBEL, supra note 20, at 120 (indicating that rules are mandatory and less
flexible); Kubler, Pomerantz,supra note 22, at 98 (1991) (stating "German corporate law
is very rigid"); see also Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1823-24 (indicating strict
rules by stating that Aktiengesetz "requires" companies to have separate boards and
"imposes"certain other duties on board).
32 See HENN, supra note 10, §12, at 31-32 (indicating Delaware General Corporation
Law is permissive corporate statute and recognizing Delaware remains favorite state of
incorporation because its rules offer companies greater flexibility than other
jurisdictions); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law:
Articles & Comment; The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461
(1989) (stating tles of corporations are established by unilateral action of officials, market
forces, contracts, or laws); Martin Lipton and Steve A. Rosenblum, A New System of
CorporateGovernence: The QuinquennialElection of Directors,58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187,
187 (1991) (suggesting that corporate governance systems should reflect shareholders'
wishes).
33 See Andre, Reflections, supranote 27, at 1824 (noting Aktiengesetz demands more
rigid separation of its board functions, unlike those of U.S. unitary board); Kai Schadbach,
The Benefits of ComparativeLaw: A ContinentialEurpoean View, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 331,
412-13 (1998) (noting Aufsichtsrat may meet without managers whom they supervise,
while U.S. board must meet in presence of inside managers). Compare DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) (stating board of directors will control affairs of corporation), with §
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Under the American system there is a single board of directors
that is responsible for managing the business affairs of the
corporation. 34 By contrast, German corporate law provides for a
two-tier board of directors structure. 35 The first board is the
supervisory board (AUfschtsrat),36 which has the responsibility

of appointing the members of the second tier, the board of
management (Vorstand). 37 The supervisory board is statutorily
responsible for overseeing the board of management, examining
the corporation's books, reviewing its assets, giving approval for
certain management decisions, and calling a shareholder's
meeting when it is in the corporation's best interest. 38 The board
of management is responsible for conducting the affairs of the
30(1) AktG (forming supervisory board to oversee management board), and § 82(1) AktG
(indicating management board directs corporations affairs).
34 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) (stating "business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under direction of board
of directors, except as may otherwise be provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation"); Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance,
45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 787 (1994) (stating practically all states call for board of directors to
manage business and affairs of corporation). See generally, Symposium, The ALI's
CorporateGovernance Proposals:Law and Economics: Keynore Address: The Dynamics of
Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 518 (1985) (stating desired qualities of
Board are responsibility, diligence, and success).
35 See § 30(1) and (4) AktG (indicating founding members of corporation are to select
Supervisory Board, which in turn selects Board of Management); see also BEINERT, supra
note 23, at 11 (stating "AG has mandatory two-tier system, board of management
(Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat)"); HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 260
(mentioning method by which one board has duty of appointing second board);.
36 See § 95 AktG (indicating number of members to supervisory board is based on
capital amount of corporation, with three board members as minimum number, unless
"articles of association" provides for greater number, and noting corporations with more
than 20,000,000 Duetsche Mark (DM) have maximum number of twenty-one board
members); Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker ParticipationIs Requiredin a Declining
Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful IndustrialDemocracy, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 148 (1997) (stating supervisory board, Aufsichtsrat; oversees
management, appoints those members and may remove them as well); see also
DaimlerChryslerSupervisory Board Constituted,PRNEwSWIRE, Dec. 16, 1998, available
at http:/Avww.prnewsvire.com (recognizing that under German Co-Determination Law,
Supervisory Board usually has ten shareholders and ten employee representatives and
asserting that "Supervisory Board elects Chairman and appoints Management Board
[while] employee representatives are appointed by.. Court").
37 See § 30(4) AktG (stating "supervisory board appoints the ...
board of
management); see also BEINERT, supra note 23, at 11 (indicating supervisory board
appoints and removes the members of the management board); Peter Norman, Europe:
Moves to Promote Idea of Shareholder Value, FIN. TIMEs (LONDON), July 16, 1996, at 2
(noting recent government effort to revise law concerning public limited companies).
38 See § 111 AktG (outlining supervisory board rights and obligations); see also HORN
ET AL. , supranote 21, at 260 (stating management board member will not violate his duty
to the corporation by seeking prior approval by supervisory board); Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Corporate Governance: Pathway to Corporate Governance? Two Steps on the Road to
Shareholder Capitalsmin Germany,5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 222 (1999) (describing role
of supervisory board).
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corporation and representing the corporation in all matters,
including court proceedings. 39 In this respect the German board
of management is similar in function to the American board of
directors.40
A. CorporateGovernance Under the German andAmerican
Systems.
Under Germany's two-tiered board, the management board has
the sole responsibility of controlling the corporation. 4 1 Their
authority in governing the corporation may not be limited by the
supervisory board. 4 2 While the supervisory board oversees the
management board, it has no authority to bind the corporation in
any matter.4 3 The supervisory board in reality is more closely
related to the Anglo-American outside or non-managing
director. 44 Their role in directing the affairs of the corporation is
39 See §§ 76(1) and 78(1) AktG (stating board of management shall direct and
represent the association in and out of court). See generally,Dennis E. Logue & James K
Seward, Challenges to CorporateGovernance:Anatomy of a Governance Transformation:
The Case ofDaimler-Benz, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 87, 91 (1999) (describing function
of supervisory board at Daimler-Benz).
40 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) (Supp. 1998) (stating "business and
affairs of [the] corporation... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors"); see also Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1829-30 (comparing German
supervisory board with typical Anglo-Saxon board); Lynne L. Dallas, Proposalsfor Reform
ofCorporateBoardsof Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson,54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 91, 138-39 (1997) (comparing German two-tiered board system with
American board of directors).
41 See § 82(1) AktG (indicating management's authority to govern the corporation
cannot be limited); see also Miller, supra note 23, at 97 (noting management board's
responsibility over corporation's daily affairs). See generally Charles B. Craver,
Mandatory Worker Participationis Required in a Declining Union Environment to
Provide Employees with Meaningful IndustrialDemocracy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135,
147-48 (discussing system of co-determination in Germany).
42 See BEINERT, supra note 23, at 12 (stating even for "extraordinary" matters the
board of management does not require the supervisory boards approval, unless it is a
matter that is noted as requiring prior approval in the article of incorporation); TRIEBEL,
supra note 20, at 120 (stating management board authority must not be limited); see also
Viet D. Dinh, Symposium: Team Production in Business Organizations:Codetermination
and Corporate Governance in a MultinationalBusiness Enterprise,24 IoWA J. CORP. L.
975, 981-82 (noting limited influence of the supervisory board).
43 See BEINERT, supra note 23, at 12 (stating "supervisory board has no management
function"); see also David Charny, The German Corporate Governance System, 1998
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 145, 149-50 (1998) (noting supervisory board's reliance on
management board). See generallyLenhardt, supra note 10, at 555-56 (1996) (comparing
role of supervisory and management boards).
44 See HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 261 (discussing controversy regarding the
supervisory board's role ever since it began as a mandatory part of an AG in 1870); See
also § 84(3) AktG (indicating supervisory board may remove a member of the board of
management for cause). See generally Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1824
(comparing supervisory board monitoring role with outside directors on a unitary board in
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limited to reviewing and advising the management board. The
corporation's shareholders and labor representatives are
responsible for electing members of the supervisory board.4 5
A two-tiered board system has the appearance of protecting the
board of management by giving their decisions support from a
disinterested group. 46 The purpose of having a dual board system
of corporate governance is to protect shareholders from harmful
management decisions.4 7 The belief is that by having a group
that oversees the board of management's actions the
shareholders' interest will be safeguarded. 48 The difficulty with
this principle arises from the fact the board of management is
given great latitude in its authority.4 9 The level of control the
board of management enjoys,5 0 coupled with the fact that it is
extremely difficult to remove a member of management from the
American companies).
45 See § 101 AktG (indicating shareholder representatives on the supervisory board
are nominated by the shareholders and labor is to elect labor representatives to
supervisory board). The number of labor representatives on the supervisory board is
governed by the Act Concerning Co-Determination of Employees of May 4, 1976
(Mitbestimzmungsgeesetz); see also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 261 (stating
shareholders and labor each nominate members to the supervisory board); Andre,
Reflections, supra note 27, at 1826 (mentioning supervisory board consists of shareholder
and labor representatives).
46 See § 111(1) AktG (indicating supervisory board oversees management board); §
111(2) AktG (stating if board of management has overstepped the authority granted to it
by statute or the article of incorporation, the supervisory board can bring legal action
against the management; § 112 AktG (stating supervisory board represent the
corporation against management in court proceedings); see also § 93(2) AktG (mentioning
management has burden of proof to meet challenges).
47 See §93(2) AktG (stating members of board of management who violate their duties
are jointly and severally liable to the association for the resulting damage); see also
TRIEBEL, supra note 20, at 120 (mentioning management is liable for mismanagement
and breach of duty). See generally Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing
Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2030 (1993) (noting
differences between German and American corporate governance regarding protecting
shareholder interests).
48 See § 101 1 AktG (stating supervisory board represents shareholders interest); see
also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 260 (mentioning supervisory board represents
shareholders). See generally, Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1829-31 (describing
function of shareholder representatives on supervisory boards).
49 See § 82(1) AktG (indicating management's authority cannot be limited); see also
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Governance: German Codetermination and German Securities
Market, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 202 (1999) (noting supervisory boards meet
infrequently which limits their ability to monitor management boards). But see Robert E.
Benfield, Curing American ManagerialMyopia: Can the German System of Corporate
Governance Help?, 17 LOY. L.A_ INT'L & COMP. L.J. 615, 630 (1995) (arguing German
corporate managers are subject to invention from shareholders).
50 See § 82(1) AktG (stating management board's authority may not be abridged); see
also Lenhardt, supra note 10, at 556 (indicating management board may not be dictated
to by shareholders or the supervisory board). See generally Roe, supra note 49, at 200
(arguing managers and shareholders sapped supervisory board's power).
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board,51 can allow the board of management to make business
decisions relatively free from the fear of repercussions.5 2 The
American corporate governance system is characterized by a
single board of directors that manage the affairs of the
corporation.5 3 As with the German management board, the
American board of directors may delegate, but not relinquish,
their responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation.5 4 In effect, the German management board can act
coercively
without
having
their
decisions
challenged.
Interestingly, prior to the 1965 revision of the German stock
corporation act, management had the enumerated duties of
managing the corporation in such a manner as to maintain the
welfare of the corporation, employees, the people and the state. 55
The rationale the German legislature gave for eliminating these
duties in the 1965 revision was that management had an implicit
duty to abide with the requirements; therefore, there was no
need to enumerate them. 56 The elimination of enumerated
obligations to act in the best welfare of the corporation and
constituents, coupled with the freedom management enjoys,
creates an environment in which management could act
51 See §84(3) AktG (stating management board can only be removed only for cause);
see also TRIEBEL, supra note 20, at 120 (indicating management can only be removed for
cause which is not arbitrary). See generallyBernard Singhof, ShareholderParticipation
in CorporateDecision-Making Under German Law: A Comparative Analysis, 24 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 493, 561-65 (1998) (examining four weak points of supervisory boards in largely
held public corporations).
52 See BEINERT, supra note 23, at 11 (mentioning German hostile takeovers are less
attractive than elsewhere); see also §81(1) AktG (stating no limitations on management's
decisions). But see §81(2) AktG (indicating management is limited in its authority as
provided by statute or the article of incorporation).
53 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2000) (stating corporate business and affairs
are to be managed by the board of directors); see also HENN, supra note 10, §207, at 56364 (indicating board of directors manage corporation at its discretion and judgment). See
generallyPaul H. Zalecki, The Corporate Governance oles of the Inside and the Outside
Directors,24 U. TOL. L. REV. 831, 833 (1993) (explaining history of American corporate
governance).
54 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2000) (indicating directors may delegate
management authority); see also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Company, 493 A.2d 929, 943
(Del. 1985) (stating directors cannot be expect to run daily business affairs of
corporations); CHARLES R. O'KELLY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS 190 (1996) (stating directors may not "abdicate [their]
statutory power and [their] fiduciary duty to manage or direct the management of the
business and affairs of [the] corporation").
55 See 1 ENNO W. ERCKLENTZ, JR., MODERN GERMAN CORPORATION LAW 196 (1979)
(indicating 1965 revision of Stock Corporation Act eliminated many duties required of
management in1937 Act).
56 See id. at 196 (1979) (indicating 1965 revision of Stock Corporation Act eliminated
many duties required of management in1937 Act).
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opportunistically with little concern of backlash. The board of
directors will usually select a group of officers to run the day-today affairs of the corporation. 57 Officers manage the daily
business of the corporation according to mandates from the board
of directors. 58 In turn, these officers will periodically advise the
board of directors on the state of the corporation. 59 The
responsibility for the welfare of the corporation ultimately rests
60
with the board of directors.
The German management board is obligated to supply
information to the supervisory board.61 In reality, information
about the corporation or management's actions is less then
forthcoming, 6 2 and given that the supervisory board is only
required to meet twice annually, it is difficult for them to
63
effectively oversee the management board's actions.
A more common problem for the supervisory board is that it is
not completely disinterested. There has been much criticism
regarding the make up of supervisory boards because Germany's
57 See DEL. CODE ANN. § 142(a) (1998) (indicating officers are to be selected with
enumerated duties); HENN, supra note 10, §212, at 573 (mentioning directors may
delegate management authority); E. Norman Veasey, The Deining Tension in Corporate
Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW 393, 395 (1997) (stating under Delaware system,
board of directors delegate management responsibilities to others).
58 See O=KELLEY & THOMAS, supra note 54, at 156 (stating power and authority of
officers is subject to dictates and oversight of the management board). But see In re
Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del.Ch. 1996) (attributing detrimental outcomes
to ordinary business decisions made by officers of corporations).
59 HENN, supra note 10, at 578 (stating directors managing corporation have a right
to information); Veasey, supra note 57, at 395 (stating board of directors rely on reports
supplied to them regarding the status of corporate affairs).
60 See Veasey, supra note 57, at 397-98 (indicating directors owe a fiduciary duty to
the corporation).
61 See § 90 AktG (stating management board is obligated to keep supervisory board
informed about corporate affairs); see also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 260 (mentioning
management board must regularly inform supervisory board regarding business
activities); Charny, supra note 9, at 150 (stating supervisory board relies on managerial
board for information).
62 See Andre, supra note 27, at 1820 (stating management does not fully disclose
corporate information); Charny, supra note 8, at 158 (suggesting having workers on
supervisory board may contribute to managers= reluctance to disclose information and
thereby exacerbate problems present in dual board structure); Kissane, supra note 29, at
652 n. 184 (mentioning German managers object to disclosing too much information on
grounds that while helpful to shareholders it could be detrimental to corporation).
63 See Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1822. See generallyLipton, supra note 56,
at 220-21 (claiming sanguine effect of German banks acting as capable monitors through
their concentration of control derived by function as portfolio managers when voting
shares held for others and shares owned by bank as well as by function as members of
supervisory boards). But see Bernard Singhof and Oliver Seller, Shareholder
Participationin CorporateDecisionmakingunder German Law: A ComparativeAnalysis,
24 BROOK J. INT-L L, 493, 494-95 (1998) (remarking on recent scholarship critical of
strong bank influence on German corporations because of resulting inflexibility).
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largest banks and a small group of individuals usually dominate
these boards. 64 This creates an "interlocking supervisory board
relationship" between the major banks and a small group of
companies. 65 In light of the fact that these banks are also
providing the corporations with financing capital 66 and that
members of the various corporations sit on each other's
supervisory boards, these board members are effectively not
disinterested. 67 While it is true that the other components of the
supervisory board are labor representatives, 68 this has little
effect on the balance of power. 69 One reason is that it is rare for
the labor representatives to vote as a group in order to counter
the shareholder representatives' decisions. 70 More importantly,
even if there were a strict division between labor and shareholder
votes, the vote of the chairman of the supervisory board, who is
elected by the shareholders, would count twice thereby breaking
any tie.71
One safeguard the German corporate governance system has
64 See Andre, Reflections, supranote 27, at 1822. But see HORN ET AL., supra note 21,
at 262 (noting due to implicit control by few on supervisory boards, there is restriction,
pursuant to' 10OAktG, that no more than 10 board positions may be held by one person at
one time).
65 See Andre, Reflections, supranote 27, at 1822. See generallyLipton, supra note 56,
at 220-21 (claiming sanguine effect of German banks acting as capable monitors through
their concentration of control derived by function as portfolio managers when voting
shares held for others and shares owned by bank as well as by function as members of
supervisory boards). But see Singhof & Seiler, supra note 63, at 494-95 (remarking on
recent scholarship critical of strong bank influence on German corporations because of
resulting inflexibility).
66 See Charny, supra note 9, at 157 (stating bank provide financing capital as well as
investment decisions); Visentini, supra note 26, at 839 (indicating banks providing
financing as debt and as equity through affiliates they own or influence such as mutual
funds and brokerage firms); see also Andre, supra note 9, at 118 (discussing recent
backlash to German corporate financing practices, partly because of poor auditing
standards).
67 See Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1822 (indicating companies have members
on eachother's supervisory boards creating an interlocking relationship).
68 See § 101 AktG (indicating labor nominates its representative to supervisory
board); HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 261 (indicating labor elects supervisory board
representatives); Charny, supranote 8, at 158-59 (noting 1/3 to 2 of supervisory board are
workers representatives).
69 See Andre, supranote 27, at 1827 (stating labor representatives role on supervisory
board is less then their numbers suggest); Charny, supra note 8, at 159 (stating
consultative process of supervisory board whereby labor peace is exacted despite the
adverse interest of labor with that of shareholders and managers is mysterious).
70 See § 3 MitbG (dividing labor representative into categories); § 15 MitbG (noting
groups often have different objectives and may not be unified in voting); Andre, supra
note 27, at 1826 (indicating labor members do not always vote uniformly).
71 See Andre, supra note 27, at 1826-27. 71; Charny, supra note 8, at 159,159 n.33
(noting despite labor=s numerical representation, the shareholder appointed chairman
overshadows with decisive vote).

2002]

CORPORATE LAWNORMS

developed is that if a management decision is challenged, the
board of management has the burden of proving they acted as an
appropriate manager would. 72 This is in contrast to the American
system of giving management decisions the benefit of the
business judgment rule. 73 Under the American system of
corporate governance, the board of directors is highly scrutinized.
Shareholders, both institutional and individual investors,
observe the board of directors and are prepared to challenge
director decisions the shareholders believe are not in the best
interest of the corporation or the shareholders. 74 One distinct
difference between the German and American system of
corporate governance is who is able to bring a lawsuit on behalf
of the corporation or against its directors. Under the German
system only the management board can bring a lawsuit on behalf
of the corporation, 75 and only the supervisory board may bring a
lawsuit against the management board for their actions. 76 In
contrast, under the American system of corporate governance
shareholders may bring a derivative action on behalf of the
corporation, 77 and an individual action or a class action for

72 See § 93 II AktG (stating management board has burden of proving it act with due
care); see also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 260 (indicating management must prove it
acted appropriately); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalitiesand Presciptionsin the
Vertical Dimensions of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1157
(1999) (stating no business judgment rule exists in Germany and that directors have
burden of proof they acted properly).
73 See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779-80 (1968) (stating absent fraud or
breach of good faith courts will not interfere with board of director's decisions); see also
HENN, supra note 10, at 661 (indicating courts will not interfere with decisions within
board's authority absent fraud or bad faith); Cunningham, supranote 72, at 1157 (stating
United States courts defer to managerial decisions under business judgment rule).
74 See HENN, supranote 10, at 546 (stating shareholders can bring lawsuits on behalf
of the corporation or themselves for alleged wrongs); see also Veasey, supra note 57, at
396-97 (denoting shareholders bring lawsuits for injuries to themselves or the
corporation); Singhof & Seiler, supra note 63, at 495 (1998) (indicating United States has
been called "the most lawsuit-crazy country in the world") (quoting David S. Jackson,
Litigation Valley, TIME, Nov. 4, 1996, at 72); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of
Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 74, 88 (1995) (stating role of
monitoring American corporate governance rests with shareholders).
75 See § 78(1) AktG (indicating management board represents the corporation in
matters before the courts); see also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 259 (stating board of
management represents the company in court and elsewhere).
76 See § 112 AktG (indicating supervisory board represent company against
management board). See generallyAndre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1823 (discussing
duties of German supervisory board).
77 See O'KELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 318 (stating shareholders bring
derivative suits on behalf of corporation).
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alleged wrongs. 78
The net effect of placing the burden of proof on the German
management board is that they will be less likely to act
opportunistically. While a German management board can only
be removed for cause, German shareholders have an easier proof
standard to satisfy then American shareholders.79 This lower
proof standard placed on German shareholders balances out with
the higher standards they must meet for board removal. By
contrast, American shareholders can remove a board "with or
without cause". 80 Generally, when an American board is
threatened with removal its actions will have the presumption of
the business judgment rule and the shareholders will have the
burden of overcoming that presumption. 8'
When making any business decision, management in Germany
does consider their obligations towards the corporation and the
other constituents.8 2 The German board of management
considers the interest of the corporation, the shareholders, the
employees, and the community.8 3 Furthermore, as a cultural
precept the interests of these groups will be given equal weight
when the management board considers the impact its decisions
will have on the corporation.8 4 While the American system will
consider constituent interests when making decisions, an
American board's foremost obligation lays with corporation, and

78 See HENN, supra note 10, at 1044-45 (stating individual and class actions are in
contrast to derivative actions); see also Veasey, supra note 57, at 396 (stating injured
shareholders may bring suit on their own behalf or on behalf of similarly situated class).
79 See § 93 II AktG (indicating management board must prove it acted appropriately);
see also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 260 (stating burden of proving due care rests on
management board).
80 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1974) (indicating that board and its
members may be removed at will with certain exceptions), with Andre, Reflections, supra
note 27, at 1824-25 (mentioning that members of German management board may only be
removed for "important cause").
81 See HENN, supra note 10, at 1088 (stating burden is usually on plaintiff to prove
cause of action elements).
82 See ERCKLENTZ, supra note 55, at 197 (stating management "takes into account
three separate and distinct interests"); see also Charney, supra note 9, at 149 (mentioning
German corporate governance considers employee and capital investor concerns).
83 See ERCKLENTZ, supra note 55, at 197 (stating management takes into account
three separate and distinct interests); see also Charney, supra note 9, at 149 (mentioning
German corporate governance considers employee and capital investor concerns).
84 See ERCKLENTZ, supra note 55, at 196-97 (indicating management board must
consider the interest of these groups equally in determining the impact of its actions). See
generally Andre, supra note 9, at 105 (stating German model of corporate governance
emphasizes long term welfare of company and constituents).

2002)

CORPORATE LAWNORMS

its shareholders.8 5 Therefore, while the structural approach of
corporate governance may be different, "both Germany and the
United States fit a basic pattern: managerialism plus limits
imposed to protect other key groups."86
In reality management boards under the German system
consider the interest of key shareholders, usually banks and
other institutional investors. 87 To many management boards, the
interests of small, individual investors are inconsequential.8 8 One
German banker went so far as to say, "Shareholders are dumb
when they buy stock and impertinent because they also want a
dividend."89 This is not to say that individual investors are
always ignored, only that their voice is a faint one that is rarely
heard.90
B. CorporateOwnersnip Under the German and American
Systems.
Shareholders of German public stock companies are usually
institutional investors, mostly banks, and sometimes-large block
investors.9 1 Corporate ownership by dispersed individual
shareholders, common with American companies, is rare in
Germany, 92 and generally this group of owners grant proxies to
85 See HENN, supra note 10, at 627 (stating directors owe fiduciary duty to the
corporation, and perhaps the shareholders as well); see also Andre, supra note 9, at 105
(placing more emphasizes on corporate constituents).
86 See Charney, supra note 9, at 149.
87 See Andre, supra note 9, at 105 (indicating German corporate governance model
advances stakeholder interest); see also Charney, supra note 9, at 149 (mentioning
shareholder representatives on the board are mainly bank representatives); Visentini,
supra note 26, at 843 (stating "institutions, mainly banks.... assume large stakes of
stock in ...companies").
88 See Andre, supra note 9, at 121 (stating German corporate governance is less open
and less shareholder friendly); Kissane, supra note 29, at 651 (indicating individual
shareholders are precluded from voicing their dissent); see also Leaning to Love Equity,
ECONOMIST, July 3, 1993, at 75 (indicating shareholders are last in order of importance).
89 See Andre, supra note 9, at 105 (characterizing sentiment towards shareholders
under German corporate governance system).
90 See Singhof & Seller, supranote 63, at 535 (1998) (stating individual shareholders
are reluctant to bring lawsuits); Kissane, Global Gadflies, supra note 29, at 652
(indicating minority shareholder lawsuits in Germany are rare).
91 See Daniel Standen, Insider TradingReforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracingfor
the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177 (1995) (concluding investor make-up of
German market is largely institutional); Visentini, supranote 26, at 837 (stating German
banks, in addition to giving depositors variety of investment services normally found at
brokerage houses in the United States, also own large blocks of corporate shares and offer
corporate financing); see also Andre, Reflections, supra note 27, at 1819 (indicating banks
and other individuals comprise shareholder membership of supervisory board).
92 See Kissane, supra note 29, at 652 (indicating only 7% of corporations are in
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the banks through which the shares where purchased. 93 The
rationale for granting proxies to the banks is that large
institutional investors will be better informed regarding
corporate matters, 94 and it would be too cumbersome to have
each individual shareholder vote his or her own shares. 95
American shareholders' real power in effecting corporate
governance is in their ability to elect 96 and remove the board of
directors with or without cause. 9 7 One problem facing a large
group of dispersed shareholders is they may be "rationally
apathetic". 98 Shareholder apathy occurs when there is no
individual investor hands); Visentini, supranote 26, at 837 (stating households own small
percentage of shares); see also Standen, supra note 91 (stating unlike in United States,
majority of companies in Germany are organized as private, limited liability companies).
93 See Macey & Miller, supra note 74, at 83 (indicating banks vote by proxy the shares
of individuals that are deposited with banks); see also Kissane, supra note 29, at 651
(stating "German banks administer the shareholdings of most individual German
investors, usually obtaining proxy-voting authority."); Standen, supra note 91 (noting
German banks not only lend companies money that is needed, but often are also
companies' largest shareholders).
94 See Singhof & Seiler, supra note 63, at 535 (1998) (indicating banks do not share
corporate information available to them with individual investors); HORN ET AL., supra
note 21, at 263 (stating banks recommend how proxies should be voted); see also Jill E.
Fisch, ClassAction Reform"Lessons from Secunties Litigation,39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 540541 (1997) (arguing institutional investors are much better situated to conduct
monitoring, both because they have greater resources, and because as likely repeat
players, they are experienced in all issues which inevitably arise).
95 See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: RestructuringProxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1138 (1994) (discussing negative effects of geographic dispersal on
shareholders' abilities to attend annual meetings and their ability to become informed
about corporate affairs in order to exercise their voting rights intelligently); George Ponds
Kobler, Shareholder Voting Over the Internet:A Proposalfor IncreasingParticipationin
CorporateGovernance, 49 ALA. L. REV. 673, 675 (1998) (stating as corporate ownership
became widely dispersed across geographic areas, it became increasingly inconvenient for
shareholders to attend meetings, effectively disenfranchising absent shareholders); see
also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 263 (suggesting banks voting individual investors'
shares by proxy is only viable alternative to dispensing with this group's vote).
96 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1974) (Supp. 1998) (indicating directors are
elected at annual shareholder meetings); see also HENN, supra note 10, at 511 (stating
some or all directors are elected at annual shareholder meeting); Fisch, supra note 95, at
1134 (noting all primary state corporation laws governing shareholder rights require that
corporations' board of directors be elected by shareholders).
97 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1974) (Supp. 1998) (indicating directors or
entire board may be removed with or without cause); see also Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d
603 (Del. Ch. 1988) (permitting bylaws to be amended to remove director without cause);
Lawrence Hamermesh, CorporateDemocracy and Stockholder-AdoptedBy-Laws: Taking
Back the Street, 73 TuL. L. REV. 409, 411-15 (1998) (discussing dearth of precedent in
continuing shift in balance of corporate power from directors to stockholders through use
of stockholder-adopted-by-law provisions).
98 See Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
522 (1990) (concluding most modern corporate scholars, especially those with law-andeconomics bent, accept shareholder passivity as inevitable); Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate
Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations,46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 317, 325-26 (1998) (discussing "collective action" problems inherent in
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majority shareholder and the shareholders are geographically
dispersed. 99 Shareholders have been able to overcome rational
apathy by creating voting trusts and other voting agreements. 00
This allows shareholders to combine their voting rights into a
block through which they can affect some control over the board
of directors and corporate governance.
Another source of shareholder power over corporate
governance lies within the efficient capital market hypothesis.
The efficient capital market hypothesis states that a security
reflects all available information in the stock price.101 Therefore,
under this theory the directors and officer's ability to effectively
manage the affairs of the corporation will be reflected in the
stock price.102 If a corporation is inefficiently governed it will be
reflected in a lower share value. Shareholders can liquidate their
investment in a corporation if they are dissatisfied with the way
it is being managed. 103 This is of concern to directors because
shareholder passivity and failure to exercise their voting rights).
99 See Black, supra note 98, at 522 (explaining since individual shareholders own
only small fractions of particular company's stock they cannot be expected to care about
voting and never will); Pinto, supra note 98, at 325-26 (analyzing majority view of
shareholders as passive with preference for exit by selling rather than using their voice to
challenge management).
100 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(a), (c) (1974) (Supp. 1998) (allowing shareholders
to create voting trusts and other voting agreements); see also Carol Goforth, Proxy
Reform as a Means of IncreasingShareholdersParticipationin Corporate Governance:
Too Little, But Not Too Late, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 379, 448 (1994) (recommending various
changes to existing law to allow shareholders a greater role in corporate governance);
Kobler, supra note 95, at 699-700 (1998) (proposing use of Internet technology to increase
shareholder activism).
101 See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 203 (stating price reflects all
available relevant information); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading,35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-67 (1983) (stating social gains
from efficient capital markets are well known); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554-55 (1984) (defining
efficient capital market hypothesis as stock price reflecting all relevant available
information).
102 See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 204 (stating skill and diligence of a
corporation's officers and directors is reflected in the stock's value); see also Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1278 (1982)
(stating informed professional investor contributes to an efficient stock market); Richard
A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
159, 160, 165-66, 168, 172-73 (1986) (discussing information as related to stock prices).
103 See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 174-76 (stating shareholders are
unable to make management decisions; implied that they can sell stock if not satisfied
with corporate policies); see also Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing
ShareholderParticipationin CorporateGovernance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM.
U. L. REV. 379, 448-53 (1994) (recommending various changes to existing law to allow
shareholders a greater role in corporate governance); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate
Governance and ManagerialIncompetence: Lessons From IOM4T, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037,
1088-96 (1996) (discussing corporate governance system).
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their ability to satisfy shareholder expectations of corporate
governance directly affects their ability to raise corporate
capital. 0 4 The reality of American corporate governance is there
are mechanisms in place which shareholders can use to influence
the business and affairs of the corporations they own, but
management is of the company is freely left to the directors' and
officers' discretion.105 Several commentators actually state that
shareholders are powerless to effect corporate governance. 10 6
IV. CONVERGENCE OF AMERICAN AND GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
There is actually a move in Germany and the United States to
transform corporate governance. While each country is
approaching the transformation independently, they are both
moving towards uniformity given each country's unique system of
governance.
A. Conscious Changein CorporateGovernance
For example, Germany is trying to move away from the large
bank-ownership dominated system to include a greater number
of smaller, individual investors in corporate governance. 107 There
104 See Visentini, supra note 26, at 836 (indicating corporations collect capital directly
from public investors); see also James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate
Governance and United States InstitutionalInvestors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-11
(1995) (discussing increasing trend of United States institutional investors entering
European market); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States
and Japan: Venture Capitaland the Comparative CorporateGovernanceDebate, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 865, 872 (1997) (discussing corporate governance systems in Japan and United
States).
105 See generally Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000:
Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 349, passim (2000)
(chronicling role of shareholders with respect to corporate governance changes in the
twentieth century); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 898-99 (1996)
(engaging in corporate governance debate); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The
Active Board ofDirectorsand Performance of the Large Publcly Traded Corporation,98
COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1293 (1998) (suggesting "Darwin's logic," should be applicable to
corporate management, and that improved corporate governance is that "grain of sand" in
"large-scale, highly bureaucratic corporations").
106 See Macey & Miller, supra note 74, at 81 (indicating shareholders are powerless to
affect corporate governance); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, passim (1990) (discussing passivity of shareholders
and arguing it may be partly a function of legal rules); Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein, Opting Out of FiduciaryDuties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65
WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1990) (stating continued importance of shareholder voting rights).
107 See Andre, supra note 9, at 112 (indicating Germany wants to attract greater

2002]

CORPORATE LA WNORMS

is a belief among German policymakers that the bank-dominated
system has hindered Germany's economic growth,108 therefore,
there is a move to develop a more diverse stock market.109 One
method Germany is using to increase individual investor
holdings is to lower the minimum share price in order to make
investments more affordable to smaller investors.110 While this
lower minimum investment level has produced some increase of
smaller investors, it has not produced the overwhelming push for
an individual investor capital market that was expected. 11 In
fact, there has been a decrease in individual share ownership
over the years.112 Culture plays a major factor in why the
German public is reluctant to invest in Germany's stock
market.11 3 The German populace is more risk adverse than their
number of smaller investors); Kissane, supra note 29, at 652 (stating federal legislation
introduced in Germany aims to reduce bank holdings); Macey & Miller, supra note 74, at
108 (indicating bank dominance in Germany is eroding); Singhof & Seiler, supra note 74,
at 540 (stating Germany wants to build its capital market to improve "quantity, quality
and diversity" of its market).
108 See John J. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 664
(1999) (stating German financial landscape is in rapid transition, and there is widespread
sentiment "that the system of bank-centered finance is hindering German economic
development") (quoting Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutsche Telecom, German Corporate
Governance, and the Transition Costs of Capitalism,1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 185, 186
(1998)); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Governance: Pathways to CorporateConvergence?
Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 219,
220 (1999) (indicating political actors believe economic development in Germany is
hindered by the bank financing system).
109 See Gordon, supra note 108, at 220 (stating "desire to develop stock market
channels for equity finance"); see also Andre, supra note 107, at 112 (indicating
Germany's desire to attract smaller investors); Singhof & Seller, supra note 63, at 540
(indicating Germany's desire to promote its stock market; stating Germany wants to build
its capital market to improve its "quantity, quality and diversity").
110 See Andre, supra note 9, at 112 (stating legislation enacted to reduce nominal
share value to 5 DM); Singhof & Seiler, supra note 63, at 541 (indicating minimum par
value has been reduced from 50 DM to 5 DM); . See generally James H. Freis, Jr., An
Outsider'sLook into the Regulation ofInsider Tradingin Germany: A Guide to Securities,
Banking and Market Reforn in FinanzplatzDeutschland,19 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV.
1, 61 (1996) (considering high fees charged for securities trades could limit benefits of
such change).
111 See Andre, supra note 9, at 112 n. 218 (indicating lower nominal value has help
one firm increase individual shareholder holdings but other factors limit benefit of lower
nominal values); Kissane, supra note 29, at 652 (stating only 7% of shares are owned by
individual investors). See generally Singhof & Seiler, supra note 63, at 540-41 (noting
Financial Market Promotion Act and Small Stock Corporation Act designed to promote
diversity in shareholding and reduction in share prices).
112 See Singhof & Seiler, supra note 74, at 542 n. 188 (stating individual shareholder
stock ownership decreased). See generallyAndre, supra note 9, at 99 (noting number of
publicly traded companies is small); Kissane, supra note 29, at 652 (stating only 7% of
shares are owned by individual investors).
113 See Christina Escher-Weigart, Corporate Governance: The Development of
CorporateGovernancein Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 243, 245 (1999) (stating loss in
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counter parts in the United States. 1 14 Germans traditionally save
a larger portion of their income to put towards the purchase of a
home, leaving little earnings to risk in capital markets.1 1 5 The
German market is still dominated by bank ownership, and
therefore, control of the supervisory board remains under bank
representative control.11 6 Another reason for the low percentage
of individual investor stock ownership is the public's distrust of
the stock market in Germany."i 7 Germans do not trust
corporations or corporate governance in Germany to look after
their interest, 18
An additional problem affecting a vibrant capital market in
Germany is codetermination. 119 Some believe that the
management and shareholders may dilute the supervisory board
two world wars led to "economic instability" keeping Germans away from capital
markets); see also Gerald L. Neuman and Mark J. Roe, Convergence and Diversity in
Private and Public Law, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 181, 184 (1999); Singhof & Seiler, supra
note 63, at 542 (noting German's deep-rooted cultural conviction that shares are to risky).
114 See Andre, supra note 9, at 119-18 (indicating German individuals invest in
conservative investments); Singhof & Seiler, supra note 63, at 542 (noting German's deeprooted cultural conviction that shares are to risky). See generallyEscher-Weigart, supra
note 113, at 245-46 (stating loss in two world wars led to "economic instability" keeping
Germans away from capital markets).
115 See Escher-Weigart, supranote 113, at 245-46 (stating Germans save to purchase
homes leaving little for "private investment); see also Neuman & Roe, supra note 113, at
184 (citing to Ms. Escher-Weigart's article); see also Andre, supra note 9, at 97 (citing
Chancellor Kohl statement that Germans are more happy to invest in cars, houses and
holidays, but not shares).
116 See Kissane, supra note 29, at 652 (denoting banks own approximately 93% of
shares); Singhof & Seiler, supranote 63, at 542 n. 188 (noting 83% of share are owned by
large investors); Visentini, supra note 26, at 837 n. 11 (indicating German banks and
institutional investors control 83% of share ownership).
117 See Kissane, supra note 29, at 652 (indicating only 7% of shares are owned by
individual investors because they distrust German capital markets). See generally
Escher-Weigart, supra note 113, at 245-46 (noting that a small investor has almost no
chance of influencing business politics of corporations); Daniel James Standen, Insider
Tradings Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 177. (1995) (noting public disenchantment with stock markets promoted
acceptance of insider trading practice).
118 See Escher-Weigart, supra note 113, at 246 (indicating monitoring cost and
public's lack of corporate influence as deterrent to investment); Gordon, supranote 108, at
222 (stating institutional investor corporate opportunism inhibits diverse capital
markets). See generally Standen, supra note 117 (noting a widely held belief that the
functioning of the stock market is slanted in favor of large, sophisticated traders, and to
the acceptance of this structure).
119 See Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 5
COLLM. J. EUR. L. 199, 201 (1999) (stating "codetermined structure fits poorly with
diffuse ownership); see also Helmut Kohl, Path Dependence and German CorporateLaw:
Some Skeptical Remarks from the Sidelines, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 189, 194 (1999)
(indicating management and shareholder may keep supervisory board weak to limits
labors representation's control). See generally Neuman & Roe, supra note 113, at 183
(discussing Friedrich Kubler's belief that codetermination is only one reason why German
securities markets are weak).
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authority in order to limit the labor representative's control. 120
The effect of maintaining a weak supervisory board is to allow
the management board to operate with little monitoring. Without
proper monitoring the management board is more apt to act
opportunistically, and thereby undermining individual investor
confidence. While codetermination is part of the German
culture, 12 1 its importance in recent years has diminished.122 For
example, German companies are willing to forgo burdensome,
and costly labor contracts in order to become more competitive in
the global market place.12 3 It is moves such as this that will make
German corporation more profitable and therefore, more
attractive as investments. Therefore, while there is a trend to
move towards an American style capital market with boarder
diversity of shareholder ownership the German system is still
characterized by a narrow shareholder base. The German
government, as well as some German corporations, have devised
a plan to jump-start their equity markets. In July of 1998 the
London and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges announced their plan to
integrate their markets, allowing each countries securities to
trade on both exchanges. 124 Also, some corporations have taken it
120 See Roe, supra note 119, at 202 (indicating information flow is restricted in order
to constrict supervisory boards monitoring); see also Kohl, supra note 119, at 194 (stating
supervisory board is kept weak to limit labors representation's effect). See generally
Neuman & Roe, supra note 113, at 183 (discussing Friedrich Kubler's belief that German
private firms have diluted form of codetermination).
121 See Kohl, supra note 119, at 195 (stating codetermination is solidly embedded in
the German mind, even among citizens who are not fond of unions); see also § § 1, 7
MitbG (stating number of labor representatives on the supervisory board is governed by
4,
1976
of May
Co-Determination
of Employees
Act Concerning
the
(Mitbestimmungsgeesetz)); see also HORN ET AL., supra note 21, at 277 (stating
Codetermination Act in 1976 established labor's parity with shareholders on supervisory
board).
122 See Cecilie Rohwedder, Once the Big Muscle of German Industry, Unions See it
All Sag: Membersbip and Clout Slip as CountryRues the Cost ofLaborInflexibiity,WALL
ST.J., Nov. 29, 1999, at Al (indicating German labor organizations power is diminishing).
123 See Rohwedder, supra note 122, at Al (describing situation where a German
computer chip maker refused a union labor contract because it would not allow the
company to compete in the global market, and instead devised its own incentive package
based on merit and performance for its employees); see alsoAndre, Reflections, supra note
27, at 1827 (stating codetermination has in fact had little impact on substantive decisions
reached by boards of directors); Henry Hansman, When Does Worker Ownership Work?
Esops, Law Firms, Codetermination.And Economic Democracy,99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1803
(1990) (asserting primary effect of codetermination has arguably been to provide labor
union members with informational rather than participatory seats on boards of directors).
124 See Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptionsin the Vertical Dimensions of
Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1151 (indicating "deepening of
European capital markets"). See generally Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and
U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of Economic Transformation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J.
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upon themselves to list their securities on foreign exchanges into
to draw greater equity investments and a broader shareholder
base. 125
By contrast, the American system of corporate ownership, and
governance, over the last 30 years has moved from individual
shareholder to institutional investor's control. 26 But while
institutional investors have the resources to stay well informed
regarding corporate matters, 12 7 they have remained reluctant to
take an active role in corporate governance.128 There are several
reasons why institutional investors are not as active in corporate
governance as would be expected. For example, institutional
investors have a wide range of investments in their portfolios
making active participation in the management of each
investment impractical. 2 9 Similar to the German system,
S77, S80 (1994) (pointing to a shift away from use of central bank in Germany for
financing business, and toward the use of international securities markets); James A.
Fanto and Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes ofForeign Companies Regarding
a U.S. Listing,3 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 51, 70 (1997) (reporting results of surveys taken
in 1995 and 1996 illustrating belief of several German corporations that they had no need
of raising equity capital in U.S.).
125 See Coffee, supra note 108, at 676-77 (pointing out importance of Daimler-Benz
decision to list on N.Y. Stock Exchange as prelude to its acquisition of Chrysler); Gordon,
supra note 108, at 224-26 (citing one goal of privatization of Deutsche Telekon,
government owned German telephone company, was to promote a German shareholder
culture); Rohwedder, supranote 122, at A18 (stating Inferion preparing for listing on New
York Stock Exchange).
126 See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1009, 1017-18 (1994) (stating growth in institutional investment has led to
greater corporate accountability, with greater institutional stake leading to more
compelling reason to monitor corporate management); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and
Entrepeneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85 CALIF. L.REV. 1,3 (1997) (stating
institutional investors have traditionally been passive shareholders in U.S., despite fact
they now own most of the stock issued by American corporations).
127 See Visentini, Compatibility and Competition, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833, 842
(1998) (stating large institutional investors "have the resources to acquire large stakes in
companies and hence take an active role in their management"); see also Eric Dorkin,
Development, the IMF, and Instituional Investors: the Mexican Finacial Crisis, 9
TRANSNATIONAL L. &CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 252 (1999) (stating as more individual
investors turn to managed investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and pension funds,
a greater concentration of wealth and corresponding increase in market control is vested
in institutional investors).
128 See Andre, supra note 9, at 147 (stating institutional investors rarely have use the
avenues available to them to affect corporate governance); Visentini, supra note 127, at
842 (indicating large investors have not taken an active role in management as expected).
129 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L.REv. 811, 822-23 (1992) (pointing to legal obstacles, including
being considered member of control group, and corresponding adverse consequences
under securities and bankruptcy law). But see Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.REV. 520, 524 (1990) (pointing out increased stake in outcome,
and increased ease of coordinated activity among institutions, can overcome investor
passivity).
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institutional investors in America invest in companies that are
their clients. 130 Additionally, institutional investors are generally
more concerned with managing their own corporate affairs to
interfere in the corporate matters of their investments. 13 1 There
has even been federal legislation geared towards institutional
132
investors' taking a more active role in corporate governance.
Despite federal legislation, institutional investors remain
reluctant to actively participate in corporate governance matters,
but as courts look to which investor is the "most adequate
plaintiff' in securities litigation matters institutional investors,
with the largest stake in the companies, will have to take the
lead.13 3 Therefore, the hope is that institutional investors, as
shareholders, will be more likely to monitor the companies in
which they invest, before matters lead to litigation.

130 See Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ.
L.REV.533, 542 (1997) (stating active participation by institutions in litigation may cause
sacrifice of many of the benefits resulting from close relationship between corporation and
institution, such as superior access and influence); Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A
and 3D and the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 NW.
U.L.REV. 376, 403 (1992) (describing conflict of interest faced by money managers
between serving beneficiaries of pension plan as required by ERISA on the one hand, and
supporting corporate management on the other).
131 See generally William Dale Crist, The Domestic and International Corporate
Governance Role of the California Public Employees' Retirement System, Address at
Universita Cattolica Del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy (Oct. 1994) (unpublished paper,
available at Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (stating U.S. pension funds
institutional investors are beginning to become more involved in management of
corporations). But see 29 C.F.R. 2509.94-2 (1996) (stating it may be appropriate for
institutional investor to engage in active role in corporate governance if investor
concludes that such role is likely to enhance value of investment).
132 See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1,
78u-4 (2000) (providing for investors with largest financial interest, usually institutional
investors, to become lead plaintiff); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1996) (stating it may be
appropriate for institutional investors to engage in monitoring or influencing
management of corporations ... if it is likely to enhance value investment). But see
Investing in Lawsuits, CRAIN COMM., Oct. 16, 2000, at 10 (stating trend of pension funds
in initiating or joining corporate securities litigation against companies in their
investment portfolios).
133 See In re Cendant, 182 F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. N.J. 1998) (naming CalPERS most
adequate plaintiff); Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 545 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(indicating institutional investor was most adequate plaintiff); see also Stuart M. Grant,
Appointment of Lead Plaintiff under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1070
PLICoRP 547, 553 (stating when there is competition for lead plaintiff position courts
select institutional investors over non-institutional investors). See generallyDel. Judge
Uses Reform Act Model, Chooses InstitutionalInvestor for Lead Role, DEL. CORP. LITIG.
REP., Nov. 13, 2000, at 3 (reporting Delaware Judge chose institutional investor as lead
plaintiff in shareholder challenge against corporation). But see Investing in Lawsuits,
CRAIN COMM., Oct. 16, 2000, at 10 (stating trend of pension funds in initiating or joining
corporate securities litigation against companies in their investment portfolios).
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B. GlobalMergersAffecting CorporateGovernance.
There is one additional factor leading to a convergence of
corporate governance, which are transnational mergers. When
corporations from different countries merge, they must not only
merge different cultural norms but many times their approaches
to legal norms. 13 4 Cross-boarder mergers, such as the DaimlerChrysler merger, create a situation that requires a convergence
of governance norms. 135 As more cross-board mergers occur,
corporate governance norms will become more uniform. 136 A byproduct of harmonized governance norms in a global economy
will be that foreign equity investment will become less risky. 137
One change that Daimler-Chrysler announced was a shift to
"U.S. style compensation patterns for senior management. 138
This change will have the possible effect of leading to greater
focus on corporate profitability, which in turn will make DaimlerChrysler a more attractive investment. Since Daimler-Chrysler is
setting the template for cross-board mergers in Germany we can
134 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptionsin the Vertical
Dimensions of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1145 (1999)
(stating multinational firm's choice of domicile is affected by legal and cultural
constraints); Gordon, supra note 108, at 228 (indicating Daimler-Chrysler merger may
lead to new governance norms). See generally John H. Farrar, The New Financial
Architecture and Effective Corporate Governance, 33 INT'L LAW. 927 (1999) (suggesting
importance of development of voluntary international corporate governance norms similar
to international accounting standards).
135 See Gordon, supra note 108, at 228 (indicating Daimler-Chrysler merger may lead
to new governance norms). See generallyJohn H. Farrar, supra note 134, at 927 (PP)
(suggesting importance of development of voluntary international corporate governance
norms similar to international accounting standards); Roberta S. Karmel, The IOSCO
Venice Conference, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1989, at 3 (stating purpose of global securities
harmonization is to protect investors from fraud and to promote access to capital).
136 See Cunningham, supra note 134, at 1146 (denoting harmonization of corporate
governance through selection of best procedures). See generally John H. Farrar, supra
note 134, at 927 (suggesting importance of development of voluntary international
corporate governance norms similar to international accounting standards).
137 See also Gordon, supra note 108, at 238 (1999) (indicating Daimler-Chrysler set
stage for international investment into Germany's capital market). See generallyFarrar,
supra note 134, at 927 (suggesting importance of development of voluntary international
corporate governance norms similar to international accounting standards); Roberta S.
Karmel, supra note 135, at 3 (stating purpose of global securities harmonization is to
protect investors from fraud and to promote access to capital).
138 See Gordon, supra note 108, at 236; see also Gregory L. White and Brian Coleman,
DaimlerChryslerPay Scale to Lean Toward US, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1998, at A3 (stating
Daimler-Chrysler pay scale for executives will be similar to American pay scales). See
generally Richard Tomlinson, Europe's New Business Elite; Wake up, America. Today's
European CEO is a global animal who lives to do deals andmake shareholdersrich. One
of them could be your next boss., FORTUNE Apr. 3, 2000, at 177 (discussing trend of
European CEO's receiving large salaries akin to the American counterparts).
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expect such A move from other German corporations.13 9
V. CONCLUSION

The American and German systems of corporate governance
developed from the same fundamental law, the law of merchants.
Over the years each system developed over different paths to the
current models because of differences in cultures, politics, and
history. Nevertheless, each system arrived at functionally the
same result, management is responsible for conducting the
business and affairs of the corporation and the owners monitor
their activities. Under the American approach shareholders elect
and monitor the board of directors who manage the corporation's
affairs. Under the German system the shareholders and
employees of a company elect a supervisory board that is
responsible for selecting and monitoring the management board
who is responsible for corporate matters. While corporate
ownership in Germany tends to be in the hands of a relatively
small group of institutional investor, and in American ownership
is characterized by geographically dispersed investors, the two
seem to be trying to converge on a balance of large and small
investors.
Shareholders under the American system of corporate
governance, and in particular individual investors, have a
greater opportunity to affect corporate governance thAn their
counterparts in Germany. Germany's goal in enacting legislation
to promote individual investors was to minimize the control and
dominance of banks in corporate governance, and to broaden the
diversity of those monitoring management. Germany will have to
fundamentally change its system to overcome shareholder
distrust of the stock market, as well as other cultural norms, to
attract a more diverse group of investors. Conversely, for
institutional investors in America to become more active in
corporate management they will need to take a lesson from their
German counter parts. American institutional investors will need
to select skilled individuals to act as their representatives on the
139 See Gordon, supra note 108, at 238 (1999) (stating "governance precedent set [by]
DaimlerChrysler... may be hard to resist in other German firms"); see also Tomlinson,
supra note 138, at 177 (discussing recent trend of European CEO's receiving large
salaries akin to their American counterparts).
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board of directors of the companies in which they invest, similar
to the German bank representatives on the supervisory boards.
One major challenge facing large American investors is having
enough control on the board of directors to affect any real change.
In sum, even though Germany and America took different
paths in corporate governance both reached similar results.
Management under both systems is charged with directing
corporate affairs. As a greater amount of global mergers occur,
corporate governance in Germany, the United States and other
countries will develop to be more uniform. Already Germany is
moving toward a more American style of corporate ownership,
and management. For example, Jurgen Schrempp, the German
co-chairman of Daimler-Chrysler's management board has been
called a "maverick" because of his unique, American style
approach to corporate governance, company performance and
shareholder satisfaction. 140 With each new deal small steps are
taken to make cross-boarder corporate governance appear
seamless. In the end there may be less distinctions then there are
similarities.

140 See Karen Lowery Miller, The Auto Baron, Bus. WI-, Nov. 16, 1998, at 82 (stating
Schrempp is not afraid to shakeup the status quo); see also Christine Tierney, Can
Schrempp Stop the Careeningat Chrysler, BUS. WK., Dec. 4, 2000, at 40 (describing
Schrempp's merger with Chrysler as a "bold deal"); World 325s Most Respected
Companines 5, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at 5 (describing Schrempp as showing "daring
behavior in the motor industry").

